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COMMENT
Developing Disaster: How Developers Are Using a
Covenant to Steal from Homeowners and Why the States
Should Stop Them*
I. Introduction
In the majority of states today, homebuyers may receive an unpleasant
surprise when they attempt to sell their home. Included in the huge stack of
papers signed at the purchase of the home may have been a private transfer
fee covenant. If the developer of the property added such a covenant, every
time an owner sells the property for the next ninety-nine years, a full 1% of
the purchase price is due to the developer. This means that a couple
purchasing their very first home, naïve and unaware of the consequences,
may unwittingly sign a document requiring them to pay a large fee just to
sell their home. Companies in several states are patenting this idea and
selling it to developers as a way to create a significant cash flow for years
to come. Homeowners are thus innocently drawn into a covenant they
previously knew nothing about, with significant consequences arising down
the road.
As an example of how transfer fees work, assume you were to buy a
house today. Prior to your purchase, the developer added a transfer fee
covenant in the chain of title which would purportedly run with the land for
ninety-nine years. You do not pay a transfer fee on your initial home
purchase. However, when you decide to sell, possibly years later, you must
then pay a transfer fee before clear title may be transferred to the next
buyer. Theoretically, you paid a lower purchase price because the
developer lowered the price after selling the right to receive future transfer
fee covenant payments. But before you may sell your home, you now owe
1% of the purchase price which may be $2000 or even more.1
Transfer fee covenants represent a sizeable step away from traditional
property and contract law. These covenants may dangerously inhibit
alienability of land as well as violate the law of covenants. A transfer fee
covenant2 is a covenant which binds a purchaser of real property and runs
* I would like to thank Professor Joyce Palomar for her topic suggestion, edits, and
advice. Additionally, I would like to thank my parents and baby brother for their life-long
encouragement and support without which I would not be who I am today.
1. See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee
Covenants, 24 PROB. & PROP. 20, 21 (2010).
2. This comment will use the terms “transfer fee covenant,” “private transfer fee,” and
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with the land for up to ninety-nine years.3 It operates by requiring each
successive purchaser to pay 1% of the purchase price to the developer of
the subdivision.4 A basic and historic tenet of the law of real property is
freedom of transfer of real property, also known as alienability of land.5
Transfer fee covenants represent a limitation on this central tenet of
property law.
When used by developers to bind future owners, transfer fee covenants
transform a straightforward transfer of property between the original
developer and the original buyer into something much more convoluted and
difficult. Currently, a minority of states already ban or restrict transfer fee
covenants, either in whole or in part,6 and the federal government may soon
do the same.7 This comment argues that, in doing so, this group of states is
moving in the correct direction. Restricting these covenants is both
historically and legally correct. This comment demonstrates that transfer
fee covenants cannot withstand a number of legal challenges and, in failing
at least one of these challenges, should not be permitted to bind future
owners.
The transfer of property is vital to our society, and it extends at least
back to biblical times; in fact, it may extend back much farther. For
example, Hammurabi’s Code, which was the first written code of laws,
mentions the transfer of property.8 At the very least, the Book of Ruth
provides an example of an early tradition pertaining to the importance of
the transfer of property:9 the story of the redemption of family property by
Boaz.10 During biblical times in Israel, one party would take off a sandal
“transfer fee” interchangeably; however, the term “transfer fee covenant” will be used
primarily for the sake of clarity.
3. Marjorie Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee Rights: Is
the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, 21 PROB. & PROP. 24, 25
(2007); FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://freeholdcapitalpartners.com (last visited Oct. 8,
2010).
4. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25; FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3.
5. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY 5 (1992);
see also The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, 17 HARV. L. REV. 506 (1904) (exploring
the earliest recorded exposition of the right to transfer property).
6. Kenneth Harney, Proposal to Ban Transfer Fees May Carry Pitfalls, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Aug. 21, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16645133.
7. Lew Sichelman, FHFA Moves Ahead on Rule, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 7,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 2412782.
8. The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, supra note 5, at 506; Russ VerSteeg,
Early Mesopotamian Commercial Law, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 183, 196-98 (1999).
9. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 5 (citing Ruth 4:2, 7-11).
10. “Boaz . . . bought from Naomi all property of Elimelech, Kilion, and Mahlon . . .
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and give it to another to make the transfer of property final.11 Transfers of
property were public acts: in some areas transfer required the presence of
witnesses who were not merely members of the public but instead were
“men of standing, representatives of the public power.”12 To help
supplement the public record, ancient Israelites began memorializing the
transfer of property with a deed.13 The deed was “an instrument that was
signed and sealed and that contained all the terms and conditions of the
sale.”14
Transfer of property remains equally, if not more, important in the
modern era. The English system of transfer of property is slightly different
than the American system given that each country’s modern common law
developed under different circumstances.15 In the English system,
Parliament does not allow conveyance of real property without a deed.16
Conversely, while a writing is also required to convey real property in the
American legal system, one cannot convey land itself.17 Instead, one may
only convey an interest in that land.18 Therefore, in the American legal
system, “[t]o state that a person has a particular interest in land is to state
that that person enjoys certain rights of control with respect to property.”19
Part I of this comment outlines the general structure of transfer fee
covenants, how they are created, and how they work. It includes a general
overview of the legal framework surrounding covenants, how covenants are
created, and how specific private transfer fee methods are patented and used
by companies to bind future landowners. Part II discusses possible legal
challenges to transfer fee covenants and shows that transfer fee covenants
cannot withstand those challenges. This part also includes some of the
rebuttal arguments in support of transfer fee covenants. Part III shows
several possible consequences if a state allows companies like Freehold
Capital Partners to patent and use transfer fee covenants to bind a buyer.
First, the transfer fee attempts to create a way for the developer to retain a
[and] Ruth the Moabitess, Mahlons’ widow . . . in order to maintain the name of the dead
with his property, so that his name will not disappear from among his family or from the
town records. Today you are witnesses!” Ruth 4:9 (New Int’l Version).
11. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 7-8 (tracing the differences between English and American property law).
16. Id. at 7.
17. See id. at 11.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12.
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right to the property without having any right to possession. Second, the
transfer fee covenant works as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Third, transfer fee covenants create an unenforceable covenant because the
covenant does not meet the essential requirements of the law of covenants:
privity and the “touch and concern” element. Finally, in the alternative,
transfer fee covenants violate public policy and should not be enforced in
order to protect longstanding traditions in property law. Part IV attempts a
moderate survey of the states’ treatment of transfer fee covenants, including
an analysis of Oklahoma and the majority of states which, like Oklahoma,
have not banned transfer fee covenants. Because this comment takes the
position that the minority of states have the correct viewpoint, it also sets
forward the possibilities for further action that the majority of states should
take to limit the negative influence of transfer fee covenants.
II. How Transfer Fee Covenants Are Created; How They Operate; and Why
Companies Are Patenting Them
Although people have used transfer fees for many years, the term
“transfer fee covenant” has recently become something of a buzzword.20
Covenants imposing obligations to pay homeowners’ association dues are
often used when developers sell land which will be governed by a
homeowners’ association; however, transfer fee covenants are much
different. Although some uses for covenants may in fact benefit the
community, transfer fee covenants are collected solely for use by a private
party and benefit no one else.
There are not yet any published cases specifically addressing the use of
transfer fee covenants, but that may simply be because the idea of a private
transfer fee covenant, like the one Freehold Capital Partners is trying to
patent, is too novel to have caused problems which people are willing to
take to court. Freehold Licensing, more recently known as Freehold
Capital Partners,21 is the most well-known of those using private transfer
fee covenants to collect a fee every time a property is sold.22
In total, nearly twenty state legislatures have “either restricted or banned
the use of private transfer fees” in one form or another.23 The best-known
20. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25.
21. Freehold Licensing, the original name, was later changed to Freehold Capital
Partners. This comment will use the term “Freehold” to refer to the company as a whole.
22. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3.
23. Harney, supra note 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1098 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 319 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28
(West 2011);765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155/5 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.48
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form of transfer fee covenant, which is also the most controversial, is the
version promoted by Freehold.24 Generally, under Freehold’s plan, a
developer creates a covenant and then is able to collect 1% of the purchase
price every time the property is sold after the original sale. Freehold
designates the private transfer fee as a “Capital Recovery Fee.”25 The
company claims that “[t]he process starts by filing a legal instrument
(called a “Declaration of Covenant” or “Private Transfer Fee Covenant”) in
the real property records . . . [and] [t]he result is a collateralized income
stream.”26
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has proposed to cut off
federal funds or guarantees for mortgages that support private transfer fees,
like those patented and sold by Freehold.27 The federal ban would regulate
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which account for approximately 95% of all
mortgages.28 The proposal would prohibit a federally funded loan from
being made on a home with a transfer fee put in place by the developer.29 It
would only apply to homes costing greater than the limit for federal
insurance and would not apply to businesses.30 The proposal may deter the
use of transfer fee covenants even though it does not operate as a true ban
on transfer fee covenants.
Additionally, the American Land Title Association (ALTA) issued a
press release extolling United States House of Representatives for
protecting homeowners from transfer fee covenants by introducing The
Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, which was sponsored by U.S.
Representative Maxine Waters.31 The act would prohibit private transfer
(West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821 (2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 647 (2008); MD.
CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 10-708 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. § 513.74 (2011); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 442.558 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5301.057 (West 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 571-46 (West 2010).
24. Harney, supra note 6.
25. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3.
26. Id.
27. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Proposes Guidance to Restrict GSEs
from Investing in Mortgages with Private Transfer Fee Covenants (Aug. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16480/PrivTransFeeGuidance081210.pdf; Harney, supra note 6.
28. Harney, supra note 6.
29. See Conforming Loan Limit, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.
aspx?Page=185 (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
30. Id.
31. Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2010); Robert
Franco, U.S. Congress Addresses Transfer Fee Covenants, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG (Oct. 1,
2010), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog_node.aspx?uniq=689.
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fees if the transfer for which the fee is imposed involves a federally related
mortgage.32 A second proposal, The Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure
Act of 2010, introduced by U.S. Representative Phil Gingrey, would require
a notice paper to be filed in the county recorder’s office for any private
transfer fee placed on land.33 Importantly, the act does not appear to require
notice to a homeowner before the original purchase. The disclosure
requirement seems to mirror California’s disclosure requirement.34 The
Gingrey bill also provides an additional safeguard to protect private transfer
fees: if a transfer fee covenant “imposes a transfer fee of not more than 1
percent of the gross sales price for the affected property, effective for a term
of not more than 99 years” it is presumed valid.35 A federal law might
effectively preempt state laws banning transfer fees.36 Even more
problematic, the Gingrey bill would allow only one covenant, which means
that traditional housing associations’ covenants would likely be preempted
by a covenant added to the land by the developer, who often is the first to
add a covenant because they make the original sale.37
Many terms describe transfer fee covenants: capital recovery fees, home
resale fees, reconveyance fees, recovery fees, resale fees, and private
transfer fee covenants; all of these terms refer to the same basic property
concept.38 Under any name, the fundamental idea is that a covenant is
recorded in the chain of title, the servitude attaches to the land for ninetynine years, and the burden runs with the land to bind future owners.39 After
the agreement or covenant is attached to the land, 1% of any future sale
price must go back to the original covenantors or to whomever they sold the

32. Harney, supra note 6.
33. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2010).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098.5(a) (West 2008); see discussion infra Part V.B.
35. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. § 3(c)
(2010). This provision safeguards the covenant from being invalid. It does not, however,
help the homeowner since a 1% fee on a $300,000 home is still $3000.
36. This raises an interesting question of the implications on federalism and the balance
of states’ power to regulate the property laws for their citizens versus the federal
government’s power to do so. Questions like this will likely be raised by Congress as they
debate the bills proposed; however, that question is beyond the scope of this comment and
will not be discussed in depth.
37. H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010).
38. Field Guide to Private Transfer Fees, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS,
http://www.realtor. org/field-guides/field-guide-to-private-transfer-fees (last visited Apr. 25,
2012). However, for the sake of consistency, this comment will generally refer to the
concept as a whole as a transfer fee covenant.
39. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25.
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right to receive payment, which generally includes the company that
licenses the use of the system and the real estate broker.40
A complicated system controls the sale of transfer fee covenants and the
licenses required to use them.41 Before a sale takes place, a broker
approaches an initial seller regarding the use of a transfer fee covenant to
give a covenantor the future share, or earnings, of the property.42 The
broker then collects an initial commission and also may get a share in future
earnings of the transfer fee covenant: “The licensor pays for this interest
with a note for an amount that is estimated to be the value of those future
sums generated by the servitude.”43 There is no way to predict, though,
how often or for how much the house will be sold.44 This allows the
covenantor, as Freehold termed it, to “sit back, relax, and wait for the
money to flow in.”45
Future purchasers of the property may have ways to opt out but opting
out is complicated.46 Opt outs include three possibilities: payment of the
transfer fee, buying out the covenant if more than five years has expired
since the covenant was made, and granting an option to the person to whom
the transfer fee is owed in lieu of the payment.47
In conclusion, transfer fee covenants are created by developers and often
patented by companies like Freehold in order to receive profit continuously
from a property as well as to reduce the original buy-in price of property.
While case law on point is sparse, there is vehement opposition to transfer
fee covenants by those intimately acquainted with the field of property law:
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the American Land Title Association,
and several House and Senate members from both the Democratic and
Republican parties.48 Transfer fee covenants operate like many other
40. Id.
41. Id. at 25-26.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 26-28.
47. Id. at 27.
48. ALTA Supports FHFA Proposal to Ban Private Transfer Fees, AM. LAND TITLE
ASS’N (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.alta.org/news/news.cfm?newsID=12355; see also
Jennifer Hiller, Federal Plan Likely to Curb Transfer Fees on Real Estate Deals, HOUS.
CHRON., Dec. 25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 25483861; Jennifer Waters, Watch for
Private Real-Estate Transfer Fees: Some Developers Add a 1% Fee to Cover Infrastructure
Costs, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/watch-for-realestate-transfer-fees-2010-11-01.
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covenants used for years without opposition. However, there are stark
differences between private transfer fee covenants and the less controversial
covenants.
III. Possible Legal Challenges to Transfer Fee Covenants
A transfer fee covenant is unlikely to survive any of the legal challenges
discussed in this section. However, as already mentioned, the court system
has yet to see a case in order to test these proposed challenges.49 State
legislatures, attempting to address the issue before the courts have a chance
to hear a case, have tried to save potential homeowners and buyers from the
possible repercussions of transfer fee covenants. Thus, while transfer fee
covenants currently remain unchallenged, that will likely change as they
become more popular.
At least three possible legal challenges to the use of transfer fee
covenants exist. First, transfer fee covenants violate traditional property
law principles by allowing a party to have a right to property without any
right to possession, either currently or in the future.50 Second, transfer fee
covenants violate a fundamental tenant of property law by inhibiting the
alienability of land.51 Third, property law has traditionally required a
covenant to “touch and concern” the land as well as meet the requirement
of privity between the parties in order to run with the land and bind future
parties.52 However, private transfer fees meet none of these fundamental
requirements. Additionally, private transfer fees violate public policy by
making the transfer of property so complex that experts are necessary.
They should not be enforced for the basic reason of protecting buyers and
sellers of property.
A. The Transfer Fee Attempts to Create a Way for the Developer to Retain
a Right to the Property Without Having Any Right to Possession
“The Restatement of Property defines an estate as involving the present
or future right to possession[;]”53 however, private transfer fees “attempt[ ]
to create an interest in the fee simple without any right to possession.”54 A
brief background on how property law treats estates and a person’s interest
in land is helpful here. An “estate” means an interest in land that “is or may
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See discussion supra Part II.
Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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become possessory.”55 The term applies to all interests which are created
by a conveyance and is “defined by how long possession or use may last.”56
Special limitations, conditions subsequent, or conditions precedent can limit
interests in an estate.57 A “conveyance gives its owner either (i) the right to
enjoyment of land immediately following the conveyance or (ii) the right to
potential enjoyment beginning in the future.”58 Additionally, conveyances
create either a corporeal interest or an incorporeal interest.59 A corporeal
interest is a possessory interest, meaning a right to possess the land.60 In
contrast, an incorporeal interest only gives the owner a right to use instead
of a right to full possession of the land:61 “Although at one time the list of
incorporeal interests was quite long, in modern American law there are only
three of importance: (1) the profit a pendre, (2) the easement, and (3) the
rent.”62
The three major incorporeal interests play different roles in the law of
real property. A profit a prendre allows the owner to take products from the
land, for example, in an oil and gas “lease.”63 An easement, on the other
hand, can be either an affirmative or negative easement.64 Affirmative
easements entail “the right to use servient land for a purpose other than the
removal of its fruits.”65 For example, affirmative easements include
easements of access and utility easements.66 Negative easements are those
created by grant, reservation, or by estoppel,67 and are limited to light, air,
view, support, and the right to receive water.68 Because of the limitations
placed on the creation of easements, the need for alternate mechanisms
arose “for the enforcement of appropriate ‘noneasement’ interests by and

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 9(a) (1936).
NATELSON, supra note 5, at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
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against remote owners of the properties involved.”69 Finally, rents are
usually created by term leases.70
Given the foregoing summary of estates, it becomes obvious that transfer
fee covenants create an interest in land without concurrently creating any of
the traditional or otherwise valid property interests described. Proponents
of transfer fee covenants, however, argue that a “transfer fee is an
encumbrance [-] it is not an ownership interest in the home.”71 Proponents
add that “few if any homes are sold free of encumbrances.”72 With most
homes, the buyer knows or assumes there will be an “obligation to comply
with subdivision restrictions, pay dues and assessments, grant easements to
utility companies, etc., all of which are encumbrances against the land.”73
Additionally, proponents argue that “most residential homes do not convey
the mineral rights, oil rights, and, when it comes to commercial property,
the air rights.”74
Notwithstanding, private transfer fee covenants are an attempt to create
an invalid property interest. The interest created by these covenants gives
someone an interest in land even though that party has no right to either
current or future possession of the property. The holder of the right to
receive the fee has no actual rights to the property, only the right to receive
payment. Additionally, the created covenant quite obviously does not
fulfill the requirements of a negative easement. Thus, private transfer fee
covenants attempt to create an invalid covenant between parties and should
not be enforced by a court.
B. Transfer Fee Covenants Work as an Unreasonable Restraint on
Alienation
Private transfer fee covenants violate a fundamental tenet of fee simple
property ownership. Owners in fee simple have the ability to convey their
land at any point they wish.75 The ability to convey a whole or part interest
in land is the core of fee simple ownership. A “private transfer fee
covenant impedes future land transactions by imposing additional

69. ROGER BERNHART ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND STATUTES 344 (2d ed. 2009).
70. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 20.
71. Common Myths About Private Transfer Fees, PLUS NEWS, Aug. 30, 2010, available
at 2010 WLNR 17465882.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 28.
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unwarranted transaction costs.”76 Under property law, a covenant is not
allowed to stop or restrict the free alienability of land if land is held in fee
simple.77 But a transfer fee covenant requires large sums of money, a full
1% of the purchase price, to be paid to the original covenantor by
subsequent purchasers, sometimes many years after the original agreement
is made.78 A seller may also incur additional fees beyond those imposed by
the transfer fee covenant because the developer may have sold the right to
collect the fee and the seller then has to locate the holder of that right.79
Additionally, the transfer fee may have to be escrowed if the holder of the
right to collect the fee cannot be found.80 Both seller and buyer may incur
further costs in negotiating which party ultimately pays the fee associated
with the covenant.81 The buyer may also incur additional expenses
negotiating with a title insurer over the form of the insurer’s exception for
the covenant and even more expense in obtaining financing if the mortgage
lender “insists on obtaining subordination of the transfer covenant lien.”82
Finally, if enforceable, a buyer of land may try to impose further transfer
fee covenants to recoup the costs spent in the transfer of the property which,
over time, could create additional complications from stacking of multiple
transfer fee covenants.83 This is especially troublesome in states with
absolutely no law restricting who can add a transfer fee covenant to a deed.
A multitude of transfer fee covenants may then encumber the buyer as well
as the property for a long period of time.
All of these factors demonstrate that transfer fee covenants impede a
seller’s ability fully to convey land and controvert society’s value of free
alienability of land. Since a transfer fee covenant may inhibit an owner
from freely transferring land, it should be invalidated as a violation of this
important value of property law.

76. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.
77. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.1 (1952).
78. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23. However, Freehold, in their brochure, says that 1%
of the purchase price is a “de minimus” fee. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, LEARN HOW
CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP YOU (n.d.), available at http://www.
freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/
freehold_brochure.pdf.
79. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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C. Transfer Fee Covenants Create an Unenforceable Covenant Because the
Covenant Does Not Meet the Essential Requirements: “Touch and
Concern” and Privity
Even property experts admit that the law of covenants is a very confused
area of law.84 Because it mixes traditional contract principles and property
law principles it is necessary first to survey the law of covenants.85 Once
one has a broad understanding of the law, both traditionally and as it seems
to be trending today, it becomes obvious that transfer fee covenants lack at
least two essential requirements. Therefore, transfer fee covenants cannot
run with the land to bind future owners. First, transfer fee covenants do not
touch or concern the land, thus, future owners of the property cannot be
bound by these covenants. Second, transfer fee covenants cannot create or
meet at least one of the privity requirements of the law of covenants.
Future owners should not be bound by a covenant created, at least in part,
by a private and uninterested third party.
1. Introduction to the Law of Covenants
In American common law, the law of covenants developed because land
is different than other property: land is immovable and illiquid and the
magnitude of financial investment involved in a land purchase is generally
much greater than that invested in other property.86 Therefore, although it
may seem strange that land can hold a contractual burden from decades
earlier, the doctrine of covenants is, and was, designed “to address the
heavy and unique losses” that can occur regarding land.87
The underlying purpose of the covenant doctrine was to impose criteria
required to make covenants run with or “stick” to the land such that the law
enforces only those covenants that “(1) protect dominant owners from
losses not readily protected by the market and (2) are consistent with the
servient owner’s ability to avoid nonconsensual obligations.”88 In other
words, the “law enforces covenants if noncompliance costs are high and
avoidance costs are low.”89 Courts tend to be more likely to allow benefits
to run with the land than burdens.90 Specifically, courts restrict burdens by
84. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Affirmative Covenants as Running with the Land, 68
A.L.R. 2D 1022 (1959).
85. See generally id. (describing the mixed legal nature of covenants).
86. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 350-51.
87. Id. at 351.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Shipley, supra note 83, at 1022.
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requiring “property privity between either the original parties or those
parties and their successors, or both, and that the promise involved be one
which ‘touches and concerns’ the land.”91 This is especially true when an
affirmative covenant is involved whereby the promisor may be subjected to
burdensome obligations which are much greater than the land’s value.92
For a covenant to run with the land and bind a subsequent owner the
covenant must meet at least three criteria.93 First, the grantor and grantee
must intend for it to do so.94 Second, the covenant must touch and concern
the land.95 Third, privity of estate between the original parties, between the
original parties and the present litigant, or between the party claiming the
benefit of the covenant and the party burdened is required.96
In other words, for a covenant to run with the land, the parties need a
contract, intent that the burden run, a burdened estate, a covenant which
touches or concerns the land, and horizontal benefit.97
a) The Requirement of a Contract, Intent, and a Burdened Estate
Generally, a contract must be in writing and signed by the promisor.98 A
writing is required for the transfer of land because of the statute of frauds,
which aims to ensure that evidence is available to a prospective purchaser.99
If the covenant is in a deed, even the most restrictive evidentiary
requirements of jurisdictions are met.100
Second, the requirement of intent provides that a covenant, if it is
regarding something not in esse,101 must contain explicit language
regarding the promisor’s assigns, which means they must be explicitly
mentioned or they are not bound.102 However, as a practical matter, “since
it is customary to use the technical word ‘assigns’ in instruments containing
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Jeremiah 29:11, Inc. v. Seifert, 161 P.3d 750, 753 (Kan. 2007); see also Inwood N.
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987); Neponsit Prop. Owners’
Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938). Note that these cases
impose a range of criteria, but this comment will focus on three.
94. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 20 (2010).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 353-58.
98. Id. at 354.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In esse means “in actual existence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (9th ed. 2009).
102. See generally Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.) (establishing the
explicit language requirement).
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covenants, problems as to the application of this in esse doctrine are not
frequent.”103 Some states do not follow the rule from Spencer’s Case,104
meaning explicit language regarding the promisor’s assigns is not
necessary, but they do still require intent that the covenant run with the
land.105
Third, to meet the requirement of a burdened estate, the covenant must
burden some interest in land.106 This can be any estate held by the
covenantee, but “in a few states . . . a present possessory interest in fee
simple absolute granted simultaneously with the execution of the covenant
cannot be a burdened estate unless it is also a benefited estate.”107
b) The Requirement That the Covenant Touch and Concern the Land
Another element is that the covenant must touch and concern the land.108
There is no real consensus on the definition of the touch and concern
element; generally, however, purely financial covenants do not touch and
concern the land.109 A brief survey of the touch and concern element begins
with the rule in Spencer’s Case which “established the requirement for
running of the covenant that it ‘touch or concern’ the land”110 and continues
to the Restatement of Property where the element is not found.111 Under
any definition, however, a private transfer fee covenant cannot meet the
requirement of “touching and concerning” the land, and, is therefore an
invalid covenant which does not bind later parties.
“A covenant touches and concerns the land if it affects the use, value,
and enjoyment of the property,”112 that is, for the requirement that the
103. Howard R. Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with the
Land at Law, 27 TEX. L. REV. 419, 428 (1949).
104. The rule in Spencer’s Case is that a covenant can be binding upon a third party if
there is intent to bind the party, the covenant touched and concerned the land, and there was
privity. Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.); see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at
355. “The resolutions of Spencer’s Case requiring that the covenant relate to something in
esse, or in the alternative, that assigns be specifically mentioned in the instrument containing
the covenant, in order that it run with the land, have become of less importance in a number
of jurisdictions.” Williams, supra note 102, at 423-24.
105. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55 (internal citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 355.
108. Id. at 353-58.
109. Williams, supra note 102, at 429-30; see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356-58.
110. Williams, supra note 102, at 429.
111. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55; see also Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep.
72 (K.B.).
112. In re Cnty. Treasurer, 869 N.E.2d 1065, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting U.S. Fid.
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covenant must touch and concern the land, the “covenant must limit the use
or enjoyment of the servient owner’s land.”113 Originally, the common law
utilized this requirement to guard against unreasonable restraints on
alienation.114 A “promise touches or concerns both the servient and the
dominant land if, by reason of physical locations of the servient and
dominant parcels, violation of the promise would cause harm to the
dominant owner that substitutionary relief could not cure.”115
Generally, a purely financial covenant cannot touch and concern the
land.116 For example, a covenant to pay money for a property owners’
association or to a developer with authority over the property generally
does run with the land; however, when the money is not for purposes that
relate to the land’s value, the covenant does not touch and concern the
land.117 If stated in the affirmative, this seems to mean that if a covenant
does relate to the land’s value, then it does touch and concern the land.
Proponents of transfer fees have raised a tenuous argument that a private
transfer fee covenant touches and concerns the land because it reduces the
financial value homeowners may receive for selling their home; however,
because the increase or possible decrease in value cannot be calculated with
certainty, this is a difficult argument to make. As another example, a
covenant just to pay insurance does not run, but if that covenant is coupled
with a covenant to invest the insurance proceeds in restoring the damaged
premises, then that covenant does run.118 As time has passed, more and
more covenants to pay money have been held to “touch or concern,” and
this trend shows an attitude or belief that adequate damages cannot be
awarded and that courts should grant specific relief instead.119 Also, rent
always counts as “touching and concerning” land, but “[b]ecause the
payment of rent is not even indirectly connected to the land, this judicial
solidarity is somewhat remarkable.”120 Additionally, there are exceptions
& Guar. Co. v. Old Orchard Plaza Ltd., 672 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (internal
citations omitted)).
113. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356.
114. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22.
115. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55.
116. See id. at 356-57.
117. Id. at 357.
118. Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340, 340 (1859).
119. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356-57 (citing ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW
OF PROPERTY, 471-472 (1984); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule,
103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990)).
120. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 477 (3d ed.
2000).
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for homeowners’ associations’ use of funds to benefit the burdened land
and common areas appurtenant to it; however, that is very different from a
developer or third party receiving funds for the transfer of property.121
Thus, while an argument can be made that a purely financial covenant, such
as a private transfer fee covenant, does meet the touch and concern element,
the argument is a tenuous one. Most courts holding that purely financial
covenants “touched and concerned” the land have not discussed a covenant
which was solely for the benefit of a private third party.122
The more recent view of the “touch and concern” element shows the
trend is moving away from requiring physical touching of the land.123 The
so-called Clark-Bigelow test124 “relates benefit and burden to the estates
instead of to physical land, and [ ] measures benefit and burden by
economic impact.”125 Seemingly, the Restatement of Servitudes 3rd does
away completely with the touch or concern standard; however, it ends up
being similar to the Clark-Bigelow test.126 Thus, the most updated
Restatement of Servitudes adopts the idea that the touch and concern
element is centered on intent rather than physical touching.127 The majority
of courts, however, still require physical touching.128 Therefore, for a
majority of courts, a purely financial arrangement between a private third
party and the original buyer would not be able to bind a later, successive
buyer.
c) The Requirement of Privity
The final element, the requirement of privity, is complicated, and often
presents the “greatest conflict” in cases regarding covenants and property
law.129 This element is best split into horizontal and vertical privity.
Horizontal privity is the “property relationship between original
121. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22. See generally Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v.
Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
122. See discussion infra III.C.2 (discussing some relevant cases).
123. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 479.
124. Judge Clark seems to have approved of a test formulated by Professor Bigelow,
which can be summarized as “a measuring of the legal relations of the parties with and
without the covenant.” Williams, supra note 102, at 429-30. In other words, the benefit or
burden touches or concerns the land when the owner’s legal interest is rendered more or less
valuable by the promise. Id.
125. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 479.
126. Id. at 480 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 5.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Williams, supra note 102, at 440.
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covenanting parties at the time of contracting.”130 It “is either established
once and for all at the time of contracting or it is never established for that
covenant.”131 Vertical privity means that a later owner must be the
promisor’s successor.132 The question of who is a successor depends on the
jurisdiction, but the majority rule is that for a person to be bound at law, he
must have succeeded to the identical estate held by the original promisor.133
Jurisdictions differ as to exactly when chain of privity is broken,134 and
there seems to be little consensus as to whether the chain of privity is
broken when a property is transferred by lease, adverse possession, or
foreclosure sale.135
Professor Williams gives a spectrum of five general views regarding
when the requirement of privity is satisfied by the type of relationship the
parties have.136 The first and most narrow view requires that the “[t]enure
relationship [be] between the covenantor and covenantee.”137 Second, some
jurisdictions require the parties to have “simultaneous mutual interests in
the same tract of land . . . which may have been created prior to the
covenant or may be created by the instrument creating the covenant.”138
This second view is broader than the first because privity will exist when
there is a tenure relationship, as in the first, or when one party owns an
interest, like an easement.139 Third, what may be the majority view
according to Professor Williams, privity “means a succession of interest in
land between the covenantor and the covenantee.”140 Generally, a deed in
fee simple will suffice in these jurisdictions.141 Fourth is the hybrid
position accepted by the Restatement of Property.142 This view requires “a
privity of either succession of or simultaneous interests between covenantor
and covenantee” as well as “some compensating benefit to other land
justifying the running of the burden.”143 This differs slightly as to benefits
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358 (emphasis removed).
Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Williams, supra note 102, at 440-45.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358-59.
Williams, supra note 102, at 442.
Id.
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because it seems that “the only privity required is the mere promise or
covenant itself.”144 Fifth, “the most liberal concept of privity” is the view
that privity “merely requires a succession of interest on the part of assignees
by or against whom the covenant is sought to be enforced.”145 Under this
view, privity “does not refer to any relationship between the covenantor and
covenantee.”146 Obviously, which view is taken will depend on the
particular jurisdiction; however, the law is not always clear even within this
system. Professor Williams states that “[m]athematically, there are twentyfive permutations of these five basic meanings of privity.”147 Additionally,
the requirement in each jurisdiction may change depending on whether the
covenant at issue is either a benefit or burden.148
d) The Requirements for a Benefit to Run with the Land
The above discussion summarizes what elements are required for a
burden to run with the land. The requirements for a burden are explained in
detail because the majority of the arguments regarding transfer fee
covenants classify them as a burden on the land. However, there are also
elements, which differ slightly from those discussed above, for a benefit to
run with the land.149 For example, a typical covenant used by a
homeowners’ association, which can be analogized in many ways to
Freehold’s transfer fee covenant, imposes fees on each homeowner to pay
for the common areas and maintenance.150 These fees benefit the owners
both directly and indirectly:151 first, by providing things like pools or parks,
and second, by “preserving/raising property values because of the presence
of valued amenities.”152 Since the Neponsit case, courts have consistently
“held that both the burden and benefit of a lot assessment covenant ‘touch
and concern’ land and bind successor owners of that land.”153 This makes
sense because the effect on alienability is negligible while the land is
significantly more attractive to buyers because of the added amenities.154
Thus, while some may classify a transfer fee covenant as a burden on the
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
NATELSON, supra note 5, at 359-61.
See Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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land, it is helpful to understand the requirements of benefits when
considering arguments which take a different stance.
If a benefit exists, for that benefit to run with the land it is necessary to
have a contract between the original parties, intent, a dominant estate,
“touch or concern,” horizontal privity, and vertical privity.155 Many
elements sound the same, but applied in the benefit context, some are
slightly different.156 For a contract, a benefit depends on the same
requirements as those for a burden to run with the land.157 Also, similar to a
burden, for the element of intent, if the parties intend that only the original
promisee enforce, then the covenant does not run.158 For the “touch or
concern” element, some argue the benefit of the real covenant must be of a
kind that enhances the use or enjoyment of particular land, but Robert G.
Natelson, in the Modern Law of Deeds to Real Property, argues that the
“touch or concern” test applies to the dominant and the servient estate
simultaneously:159 “The promise touches or concerns if, by reason of the
physical positions of the servient and dominant land, violation of that
promise would cause harm to the dominant owner that substitutionary relief
could not cure.”160
Generally for a benefit to run, horizontal privity is required. However,
according to the Restatement of Property 3rd, horizontal privity is not
necessary for a benefit to run.161 Some jurisdictions make the law clear in
this area, but in jurisdictions where the law is more muddled, it is generally
safe to assume privity is necessary.162 The requirements for vertical privity
for benefits are the same as the requirements for burdens except that
“tenants and sublessees may enforce promises made for the benefit of
estates held by their landlords.”163
2. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not “Touch and Concern” the Land
The “touch and concern” element is the most contentious element of the
requirements for a covenant to run with the land. Private transfer fee
covenants, such as those used by Freehold, do not “touch and concern” the

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

NATELSON, supra note 5, at 359-60.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, §§ 534, 542.
NATELSON, supra note 5, at 360-61.
Id. at 361.
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land. In their most recent brochure, Freehold claims that “the touch and
concern doctrine has been largely abandoned in favor of a contract
approach,” and that even if a jurisdiction does not follow this modern
approach, Freehold’s covenants do meet the “touch and concern”
requirement.164 Under the modern approach, adopted by the Restatement of
Property 3rd, many covenants have been held to bind subsequent owners in
situations similar to the one Freehold claims their covenant creates.165
However, private transfer fees are a purely financial burden which should
not bind future owners even under the modern Restatement. Rents and
homeowners’ association fees for common areas, as a financial burden,
have traditionally been held to touch and concern.166 Generally, however,
courts do not hold that a solely financial burden regarding the land is one
which touches and concerns the land, and the narrow circumstances
described above are customarily the only time such financial covenants are
held to touch and concern.167
Additionally, the central tenant of the most recent Restatement of
Property is the intent of the parties.168 However, the Restatement did not
utterly abandon the “touch and concern” element. Instead, it seems to have
merged that element into the intent of the parties.169 Courts following the
principles of the modern Restatement do not specifically look for “touch
and concern;” courts look instead to intent, which can have hints of the
“touch and concern” element included in the analysis.170 Although there
has been a proliferation of private transfer fee covenants since the
Restatement of Property 3rd because of the intent-based view, courts
should still refuse to hold that a private transfer fee covenant touches and
concerns the land because this would be a dangerous and novel approach.171
164. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77, at 10.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000); see also Inwood N.
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987) (holding a declaration of
covenants recorded for an entire subdivision effective to create lien on later purchasers for
the homeowners’ association fees). But see Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756, 758
(Mass. 1995) (holding public policy concerns weighed against enforcing a burdensome
covenant restriction since it did not touch or concern the land).
166. See Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22.
167. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 477.
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.1.
169. Locke Lake Colony Ass’n v. Town of Barnstead, 489 A.2d 120, 122 (N.H. 1985)
(holding that the intent of the parties was the integral element; however, only after all formal
requirements were satisfied).
170. See discussion infra Part III.D.
171. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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The common law developed partially to protect people from covenants
which unreasonably restrained alienation. The modern Restatement has not
completely abandoned these principles, and courts should continue to find
that covenants which solely benefit an uninterested third party do not run
with the land.
In jurisdictions which still adhere to the more traditional definition of the
law of covenants, courts look to whether the “touch and concern” element
is satisfied.172 In these jurisdictions, a purely financial arrangement with a
third, uninterested party, does not “touch and concern” the land. Private
transfer fee covenants are different from financial burdens associated with
rent or homeowners’ associations, which are financial burdens that do touch
and concern the land. Transfer fee covenants involve a private third party
uninterested in the land or home itself: “By the time the developer collects
a future transfer fee, the developer likely will have completed the sale of all
affected lots and will have no legal interest (other than the transfer fee
rights) in the community.”173 Therefore, “the benefit of a private transfer
fee is personal to the developer.”174 In other words, the covenant is “in
gross” and cannot, by the vast authority of common law courts, run with the
land to bind later purchasers.175
Therefore, a company adding a transfer fee covenant, like Freehold, is an
uninterested third party which cannot create a covenant that “touches and
concerns” the land. As such, the covenant does not affect the land and
cannot run with the land to bind later purchasers. A developer’s personal
interest in receiving a fee, which is often sold to yet another party, should
not be held to bind a future purchaser since the developer’s interest is
unconnected to any parcel of land. Additionally, if a jurisdiction follows
the modern view, focused more specifically on each party’s intent in
creating the covenant, courts should still refuse to find that a private
transfer fee covenant runs with the land to bind future purchasers. Even
these jurisdictions have not completely abandoned the “touch and concern”
element and courts should refrain from enforcing covenants which have
absolutely no bearing on the land itself and benefit only a private third
party.

172. Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y.
1938); see also Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987).
173. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 22.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567, 568-69 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986).
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3. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Meet the Requirement of Privity
Privity is required between the parties to a covenant.176 Freehold, in their
literature about the legality of transfer fee covenants, does not even mention
the concept of privity.177 Given that it must be established at the time of
contracting or not at all, one assumes that horizontal privity must be
established between the developer and the original purchaser. However, the
type of privity necessary is dependent on the jurisdiction, and the modern
view, as adopted by the Restatement of Property 3rd is that solely vertical
privity is required for a benefit or burden to run with the land and bind
successors.178
Private transfer fee covenants, because they are created with a third party
unconnected to the land, do not establish vertical privity.179 Thus, even if a
court were to find that the covenant did, in fact, “touch and concern” the
land, the court should find that privity was not established and thus the
covenant is invalid. Privity is not established primarily because the
company holding a right to payment cannot be classified as any of the
parties traditionally labeled as a party with privity in creating a covenant.180
Under the first four of Professor Williams’ five views of privity, there is a
colorable argument that Freehold, as a private third party uninterested in the
land at issue, does not meet the essential requirement of privity in order to
form a valid and binding covenant.181
First, in a jurisdiction requiring a tenure relationship between covenantor
and covenantee, companies like Freehold do not hold the traditional
positions required by law.182 In these most stringent jurisdictions, courts
would have a very difficult time finding the privity requirement satisfied.
Under Professor Williams’ second view, a jurisdiction should also find
the privity requirement unsatisfied. Again, a jurisdiction adopting this view
would have to find that the developer and the later buyer had “simultaneous
mutual interest in the same tract of land.”183 While that interest may have
176. Williams, supra note 102, at 440-46.
177. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77.
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.4 cmt. b (2000); see also
Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028, 1036-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). Contra Runyon v.
Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 184 (N.C. 1992) (holding both vertical and horizontal privity
necessary); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944).
179. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
180. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358-59.
181. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
182. See generally Austerberry v. Corp. of Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (1885).
183. Williams, supra note 102, at 441-45.
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been created pre-covenant or with the covenant, the mutual interest is not
satisfied by private transfer fees. A third party, such as Freehold, never had
a mutual interest with the contracting party in the land. Instead, their
interest is only in the later transfer of that land and receipt of a fee. In fact,
upon the first original transfer, Freehold’s covenant does not even come
into effect.184 Instead, the 1% transfer fee is only paid upon the sale to a
secondary, further removed, party.185
Under the third (and majority) view, privity requires “a succession of
interest in land between the covenantor and the covenantee, . . . which
succession in interest must be at the time the covenant is made.”186 Even
under this slightly more liberalized view of the privity requirement, privity
is never established between a company like Freehold and the successive
purchasers of the interest in land. A company like Freehold never actually
owns an interest in land but instead seemingly owns only a right to receive
payment upon the transfer of another’s interest.187 Because Freehold would
never have a possessory interest in the estate, the company cannot be said to
be in privity with later successive purchasers or sellers.
Under the fourth view, a jurisdiction should also find that Freehold has
not created a valid covenant because privity does not exist between the
parties.188 This view, adopted by the Restatement of Property 3rd, requires
“privity of either succession of or simultaneous interests between
covenantor and covenantee and further require[s] some compensating
benefit to other land justifying the running of the burden.”189 Again,
Freehold, even at creation of the private transfer fee covenant, never had
privity through either succession of or simultaneous interests with the
property owner. Instead, they created a contract with the developer.
Under the fifth and most liberal view, an argument can be made that
privity does exist between the holder of the right to receive a fee and the
buyer or purchaser of the property.190 This view “merely requires a
succession of interest on the part of assignees by or against whom the
covenant is sought to be enforced.”191 In jurisdictions adopting this view,
privity seems to be more about succession to the title to land as opposed to
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3.
Id.
Williams, supra note 102, at 441.
See generally Shumaker, supra note 37.
Williams, supra note 102, at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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actual interest. In these most liberal jurisdictions, Freehold does have a
colorable argument that a court should hold that they have privity with any
party who later buys or sells the land affected by the covenant.
D. Transfer Fee Covenants Violate Public Policy and Should Not Be
Enforced.
Because some states already ban or restrict the use of transfer fee
covenants, it is clear that some legislatures think a transfer fee covenant
would be enforceable absent a statutory ban. However, even assuming that
all previously discussed legal challenges were to fail, a transfer fee
covenant should not be sustained as a function of public policy. This is not
a unique view on the doctrine of covenants, being similar to the view
espoused in the Restatement of Property 3rd.192 While transferring
property, especially in our modern society, can be a complex task, allowing
companies like Freehold to patent and then use transfer fee covenants will
only make a transfer more complex. At times when buyers and sellers
already require professionals for almost every step of the process, transfer
fee covenants threaten to make what is already a seemingly impossible task
into one that is even harder to accomplish without legal and other
professional involvement in the selling or buying of real property.
Additionally, it is unfair as a matter of public policy to burden future
homeowners with transfer fee covenants. For all the basic reasons
mentioned above, homeowners will be burdened and potentially unable to
sell their land if states continue to allow transfer fee covenants to be used
by private parties to bind homeowners. This is especially troublesome if
“stacking” of transfer fee covenants is allowed. A homeowner might
encounter several transfer fees which must be paid to several different
private parties. This would undoubtedly reduce the alienability of the land
as well as simply make buying and selling the land more difficult for the
homeowner. Homeowners tend to be unsophisticated, at least compared to
professional title experts, and assuming that a new homeowner will
understand a private transfer fee covenant may simply be irrational, even if
the covenant is disclosed. This becomes even more true if the covenants
are stacked. While a deed generally must detail any covenants, conditions,
easements, equitable servitudes, mineral rights, leases, or other
encumbrances, a general reference like “subject to all restrictions of record”
will often suffice legally but does not give a buyer adequate warning of the
consequences of transfer fee covenants, except in those states which have
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
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taken a positive step to require actual notice to the buyer.193 As a matter of
public policy, our society favors the alienability of land and clear title. For
the same reasons, public policy should protect homeowners from
unexpected and sometimes very large fees, which may keep them from
transferring their interest in the land to another party.
Also, as a matter of public policy, states should be concerned that
homeowners are not receiving adequate notice of transfer fee covenants.
Many other covenants, like those used by homeowners’ associations, raise
concerns about notice which can be analogized to the problems likely to
occur with private transfer fee covenants. Generally, one would assume
that private fees placed on the land by a homeowners’ association are
visible and people tend to know the likely restrictions. However, even
when the homeowner can visually see some of the restrictions in place
because of the covenant, i.e. cut grass or no signs, notice issues still arise as
to other aspects of the covenant.194
The first major concern with homeowners’ association fees is that the
“daunting stack of papers presented to the buyer at closing” prevents the
buyer from having actual notice of the covenant.195 This concern quite
obviously carries over to other kinds of covenants, especially those even
less visible than a homeowners’ association, like the private transfer fees
advanced by Freehold.
Second, Hannah Wiseman posits that many new home buyers simply
look at the covenants as “general” and never really think that they will be
enforced.196 Again, this same issue arises with respect to the use of private
transfer fees, like the one proposed by Freehold, because potential
homeowners may never thoroughly read or understand an obscure covenant
that they are signing along with all of the other paperwork in the large stack
of closing paperwork. As mentioned above, while a deed generally must
detail any covenants or encumbrances, a general reference like “subject to
all restrictions of record” is often used, and this does not give a buyer
adequate warning of the possible covenants.197 Finally, the title insurance
commitment will show a private transfer fee as an exception from the
193. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 742-45
(2004); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098 (West Supp. 2011); Homebuyer Enhanced Fee
Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2010); discussion supra Part II.
194. See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 839.
See generally Wiseman, supra note 192, at 748-49.
195. Wiseman, supra note 192, at 747.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 742-45.
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policy, but most people do not know how to read either the title insurance
commitment or the documents listed as an exception.
Third, many homeowners are not made aware of the covenants attached
to the home while in the buying process.198 Instead, it is not until much
later, and often too late, that the homeowner is told about the transfer fee, or
other covenant, on their property.199 This is worrisome in the context of a
private transfer fee, which will require a large sum of money from the buyer
later and may even inhibit fully informed buyers from wanting to purchase
the property.
Finally, the last major problem asserted by Hannah Wiseman is that the
real estate agents, often in haste to make a sale, do not mention or fully
explain the covenants even if the covenants are correctly disclosed.200 For
example, Wiseman notes that while the common law of covenants
developed primarily because of notice concerns, and while state legislation
ensures that notice is provided, many homeowners are still completely
unaware of the existence of the homeowners’ association.201 Thus,
“[d]espite the several layers of theoretical notice protections in private
covenanted communities [ ] many homeowners indicate that they were
unaware of the covenants when they were in the process of purchasing a
home within these communities.”202 If real estate agents fail to explain a
homeowners’ association covenant, the likelihood that they will explain a
complex document which requires property purchase price configurations
seems to be very low.203
All of the points made by Hannah Wiseman regarding homeowners’
association covenants are magnified when applied to private transfer fees
used by developers, which are placed on the land for a full ninety-nine
years and cloud the title if unpaid.204 If a state adopts a public policy of
protecting homeowners at all, the state cannot allow a homeowner to
remain unaware of such a threat to their property ownership. While some
homeowners may choose the benefits of a private transfer fee, it is unlikely
that many who actually do buy a home with a private transfer fee attached
are accurately informed of the implications of that covenant.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 747-48.
Id.
Id. at 748.
Id. 742-45.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 742-48.
Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21.
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Therefore, courts should hold that a private transfer fee cannot bind
future owners as a matter of public policy. Despite possible legal
challenges, some jurisdictions may still find that private transfer fees create
a valid covenant as a matter of law, but courts should turn to an alternative
public policy rationale to find that they nonetheless create an invalid
covenant. In a system that already requires professional help for the lay
person wishing to purchase a home, it seems unforgivable to require
homeowners to look out for yet another hurdle before their next purchase.
Additionally, private transfer fee covenants should be void because they
violate the basic value of the free alienability of land. Finally, because
homeowners often are not given sufficient notice of covenants which run
with their land, it is contrary to public policy to ask them to bear the burden
of transfer fee covenants.
IV. While There May Be Benefits of Transfer Fee Covenants, the Benefits
Do Not Outweigh the Substantial Problems Created by Allowing Transfer
Fee Covenants to Be Used in Order to Obtain Private Gain
Proponents of transfer fee covenants argue that the covenants increase
the ability to provide affordable housing and promote charitable giving in
communities as well as provide funds for community growth and
improvements.205 These proponents “argue that private transfer fees are
reasonable and benefit both buyers and developers.”206 While some of
these arguments do have merit, the benefits that are gained through use of
transfer fee covenants are lackluster and the problems with transfer fee
covenant use in the private developer context greatly outweigh any of the
favorable arguments.
A. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Provide for More Affordable Housing
Joseph Alderman, managing partner of Freehold, says that transfer fee
covenants are “a means of spreading out costly infrastructure expenses and
jump-starting half-finished subdivisions hobbled by the housing crisis.”207
Freehold claims that homes are more affordable after the use of a private
transfer fee because the covenant will lower the “price, transactional costs
and carrying costs of the home.”208 The upfront buying costs are reduced
because the developer has sold the right to be paid the transfer fees and has
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Waters, supra note 48.
Id.
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thereby received income from the property.209 Therefore, the developer can
afford to sell the home for less.210 However, The Coalition to Stop Wall
Street Home Resale Fees, which is a group of realtors that backs the Federal
Housing Finance Agency’s proposal, says that the use of private transfer
fees “lower[s] a home’s equity, depress[es] home prices and complicate[s]
the safe, efficient and legal transfer of real estate.”211
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., an attorney in Irvine, California, suggests that
private transfer fees finance affordable housing through private
“endowments,” which “are essentially transfer fees collected when market
rate housing is sold and then resold.”212 Salsich proposes that “private
restrictive covenants . . . be used to provide [a] funding mechanism” for
affordable housing”213 and that the “[b]eneficiaries [of these endowments or
private transfer fees] would be private not-for-profit organizations.”214
Again, “[this] proposal calls for the foundations to [get] payments and then
distribute fees on a pro rata basis to other not-for-profit housing providers,
such as Habitat for Humanity.”215 The argument is that homeownership
costs do not increase because the upfront costs of projects and goals are
reduced, resulting in a greater availability of affordable housing and more
affordable pricing overall.216
However, it seems that a clear rebuttal argument on behalf of those
opposing the imposition of private transfer fees on future private parties is
that these reasons are not enough to justify binding a future private party
with a covenant. While the argument of the proponents of transfer fees is
noble, opponents have an equally valid argument that transfer fee covenants
may result in unaffordable housing and that owners should not be burdened
with recurring payments for each sale of the property.
The proponents of transfer covenant fees point to the fact that
“N.I.M.B.Y.,” or not-in-my-back-yard, attitudes push unwanted and
undesirable facilities or land uses to mostly minority or low-income
communities.217 The argument is that use of transfer fee covenants to
209. See Common Myths About Private Transfer Fees, supra note 72.
210. Id.
211. Waters, supra note 47.
212. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Affordable Housing: Can Nimbyism Be Transformed Into
Okimbyism?, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 453, 467 (2000).
213. Id. at 467-68.
214. Id. at 468.
215. Id.
216. Common Myths About Private Transfer Fees, supra note 70.
217. See Orlando E. Delogu et al., Some Model Amendments to Maine (And Other
States’) Land Use Control Legislation, 56 MAINE L. REV. 323, 349 n.61 (2004).
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encourage building and funding of communities will help inhibit this from
happening.218 Again, it hardly seems congruent with sound public policy to
require possible future owners to shoulder this burden. Homeowners have
many other choices if they wish to support worthy causes and they can
exercise their choice in a way that does not require them to pay for it as a
third party through a fee upon the sale of their home.
While current owners may pay less up front for their new property, there
is no proof, or even a clearly sound economic argument, that the property is
actually cheaper or that this increases the availability of affordable housing
to anyone-especially those purchasing the home burdened by the transfer
fee covenant. Additionally, there is also no proof that those affected by the
endowments are able to receive more affordable housing because of the use
of private transfer fee covenants on nearby residences.
B. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Promote a Sense of Community
Some argue that private transfer fees, in general, add to the sense of
community by allowing residents to group themselves.219 For example, it is
suggested that residents may find ways to use private transfer fees to group
themselves by common behaviors or, alternatively, by socio-economic
status.220 When this is done through private transfer fees, especially when
the entity using the transfer fee is a homeowners’ association, many seem to
think that this is a positive aspect of the use of transfer fees.221 The same
arguments made in favor of homeowner’ association fees can be made for
the use of transfer fees by private parties. Proponents of transfer fees who
do not share the same view as the N.I.M.B.Y. proponents, may argue that
transfer fee covenants should be tolerated because they are similar in kind
to the homeowners’ association fees.222
However, private transfer fees, when used solely by private parties, do
not have the same effects as homeowners’ association fees.223 For example,
homeowners’ association covenants, which are essentially private
covenants, allow a sense of community by giving a resident a choice to live
218. See id.
219. See Fennell, supra note 193 at 842.
220. See id..
221. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 713-14, 735-36.
222. See id. at 735-36 (noting private transfer fees are not solely a N.I.M.B.Y. concern
but “special interest-focused decisions but instead largely respond to broad-based consumer
preferences”); see also Fennell, supra note 193, at 831-32 (noting how voluntary rule-based
communities has generated much scholarly debate and succinctly summarizing arguments
from both pro- and anti-rule-based community scholars).
223. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 735-36.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

406

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:377

in a community that only allows a certain number of yard signs.224 This is
an entirely different decision and problem than a resident choosing or being
forced into paying 1% of the purchase price of their home back to a private
company.225
In conclusion, while the arguments raised by the proponents of private
transfer fees seem plausible, the merits do not weigh heavily enough to
balance out the consequences which befall both the buyer and the
community in which the property is located. At the very least, private
homeowners cannot possibly have sufficient notice, in most cases, to make
an informed decision about a private transfer fee burdening their property
for the following ninety-nine years.
V. A Minority of States Already Restrict the Use of Transfer Fee Covenants,
and the Remaining States, as Well as the Federal Government Should Enact
Bans to Protect Both Buyers and Sellers
Eighteen states have already restricted, in some form, transfer fee
covenants.226 The federal government also has several transfer fee covenant
proposals. One of these proposals would ban transfer covenants in all loans
financed by federally funded Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.227 As transfer
fees become more newsworthy and popular and as more state legislatures
begin to recognize the problems transfer fees could pose, more states will
likely begin to introduce their own restrictions on the use of transfer fee
covenants.

224. See Fennell, supra note 193, at 838; see also Wiseman, supra note 192, at 735-36.
225. But see Wiseman, supra note 192, at 736 (arguing consumers make the choice to
live in such a community for a myriad of other benefits despite the downfalls, including a
possible transfer fee covenant).
226. Harney, supra note 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1098 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 319 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28
(West 2011); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155/5 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.48
(West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821 (2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 647 (2008); MD.
CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 10-708 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. § 513.74 (2011); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 442.558 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5301.057 (West 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 571-46 (West 2010).
227. Harney, supra note 6.
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A. About a Third of the States Already Restrict the Use of Transfer Fee
Covenants, and Those States Which Have Not Yet Banned Them Will Likely
Soon Follow the Minority
As one critic of transfer fee covenants put it:
Although advocates argue that private transfer fees are
reasonable and benefit both developers and buyers, these
arguments are unpersuasive. Private transfer fee covenants
create an unjustified impediment to the transfer of affected real
estate; further, enforcing private transfer fee covenants (and
thereby lowering the value of the affected real estate) would
permit a developer to divert a portion of the community’s ad
valorem tax base to the developer’s private benefit—all outside
the community’s democratic processes.228
Eighteen states have adopted statutory provisions directly addressing
enforceability of transfer fee covenants.229 The states with a statute
restricting, in some form, transfer fee covenants are: Arizona, California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas,
and Utah.230 Other states have banned transfer fee covenants outright:
Florida, Missouri, Oregon, Kansas, Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Utah.231
Under these states’ bans “private transfer fee covenants imposed after the
effective dates of the relevant statutes are deemed contrary to public policy
and void.”232
Texas adopted a statute in 2007 that purported to prohibit enforcement of
transfer fee covenants.233 However, transfer fee covenants arguably still are
228. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 25.
229. Id. at 24.
230. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §
319; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155/5; IOWA CODE ANN. §
558.48; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 647; MD. CODE ANN., Real
Prop. § 10-708; MINN. STAT. § 513.74; MO. ANN. STAT. § 442.558; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.057; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017; UTAH CODE ANN. §
57-1-46.
231. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 25.
232. Id.
233. Id. The statute reads, in part:
(b) A deed restriction or other covenant running with the land applicable to
the conveyance of residential real property that requires a transferee of
residential real property or the transferee’s heirs, successors, or assigns to pay a
declarant or other person imposing the deed restriction or covenant on the
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enforceable under the Texas statute because it obliges the seller to pay the
fee and not the buyer.234 Additionally, Freehold interprets the Texas statute
to allow transfer fee covenants as long as part of the fee goes to charity.235
However, these arguments are not valid because they are inconsistent with a
literal reading of the Texas Restatement.236 Even if the buyer is not liable
for the fee that accrues, the buyer is still bears the burden of “a fee in
connection with a future transfer of the property.”237 Additionally, “if the
seller fails to pay the [transfer covenant] fee, it becomes a lien against the
land that prevents the buyer from delivering clear title to a subsequent
purchaser.”238 Finally, reading the statute literally makes it obvious that the
501(c)(3) exemption should not be used to totally exempt private transfer
fees from the statute.239 If that were so, it would seemingly negate the
statute as a whole because all private transfer fees could then be partially
routed to a charitable organization. The wording of the statute itself shows
that it was not intended to provide an exception for any and all private
property or a third party designated by a transferor of the property a fee in
connection with a future transfer of the property is prohibited. A deed
restriction or other covenant running with the land that violates this section or a
lien purporting to encumber the land to secure a right under a deed restriction
or other covenant running with the land that violates this section is void and
unenforceable. For purposes of this section, a conveyance of real property
includes a conveyance or other transfer of an interest or estate in residential real
property.
(c) This section does not apply to a deed restriction or other covenant
running with the land that requires a fee associated with the conveyance of
property in a subdivision that is payable to:
(1) a property owners’ association that manages or regulates the subdivision
or the association’s managing agent if the subdivision contains more than one
platted lot;
(2) an entity organized under Section 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code of
1986; or
(3) a governmental entity.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017.
234. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.
235. See Hiller, supra note 47 (“In Texas, state law restricts private transfer fees but says
some groups can collect them, including charities, property owner associations or
governmental entities. Freehold has interpreted this to mean that if 5 percent of the transfer
fee goes to charity, the developer and Freehold can collect the rest. Also in Texas, the fees
can be written into neighborhood covenants, accepted by home-owners when they
purchase”)
236. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id.
239. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017 (West 2008).
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transfer fees donated to a charity. The other exception listed with the
501(c)(3) exception is the exception for homeowners’ associations.240 It
seems that Texas simply wanted to protect already common and accepted
uses of transfer fee covenants. Additionally, if read very literally, the Texas
statute only exempts transfer fee covenants that give the totality of the fee
to a 501(c)(3) charity.241 Thus, the Texas statute does in fact act as a ban on
private transfer fee covenants on residential property.242
In contrast, Louisiana does not have a statute directly addressing transfer
fee covenants, but transfer fee covenants are probably unenforceable under
Louisiana’s civil law.243 Louisiana civil code “requires that a predial
servitude (which is analogous to an easement appurtenant) provide a benefit
to a dominant estate for that servitude to be enforceable.”244 This allows
personal servitudes, or servitudes in gross, to be enforced only when they
provide an “advantage,” such as an access right, that could be established as
a predial servitude.245 Transfer fee covenants, such as those used by
Freehold, do not provide such an advantage. Instead, they simply give a
right to receive payment to a third party. Therefore, while servitudes in
gross may be enforced in Louisiana, a private transfer fee covenant does not
meet this description. Although Louisiana has not banned private transfer
fee covenants, their law already seems to have accounted for them and
made them invalid.
In sum, over one-third of states have already restricted or banned transfer
fee covenants. While this is currently a minority of states, state legislatures
in the majority of states without a transfer fee covenant ban should enact
such a restriction in order to protect homebuyers. Additionally, the federal
government should follow these states’ leads and protect homeowners by
regulating the use of private transfer fee covenants.246

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 647 (2008).
244. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24 (citing LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 647).
245. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 640).
246. An interesting question is raised by the proposals in Congress regarding the extent
of Congress’s power vis-à-vis private residential laws within states. This question is outside
the scope of this comment and the question will be left open here except to suggest that
Congress find a balance that allows the federal government to protect homeowners while
also strongly encouraging the States to do the same.
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B. Although California Has Explicitly Allowed Transfer Fee Covenants, It
Has Restricted their Use
Restrictions, like those that require that notice be given to any buyer,
allow companies to continue using transfer fee covenants while mitigating
some of the negative features. Private transfer covenants are used for many
purposes that our society deems good, useful, and normal. Especially with
the rise of suburban living, a homeowner may deem any number of land use
controls perfectly suitable and useful.247 Additionally, many authors who
have discussed the privatization of public property have argued that private
transfer fee covenants are helpful and allow people to better control their
neighborhood and living space in an increasingly crowded environment and
country.248 This may be why some states are wary of a ban on transfer fee
covenants and it also may be why some states are willing to consider
restrictions on transfer fee covenants but unwilling to ban them entirely.
The only state officially validating transfer fee covenants is California.249
However, even California adopted some protections including a disclosure
247. Fennell, supra note 193.
248. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 752-58; see also Fennell, supra note 193.
249. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 752-58.
A “transfer fee” is any fee payment requirement imposed within a covenant,
restriction, or condition contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or
other document affecting the transfer or sale of, or any interest in, real property
that requires a fee be paid upon transfer of the real property. A transfer fee
does not include any of the following:
(a) Fees or taxes imposed by a governmental entity.
(b) Fees pursuant to mechanics’ liens.
(c) Fees pursuant to court-ordered transfers, payments, or judgments.
(d) Fees pursuant to property agreements in connection with a legal
separation or dissolution of marriage.
(e) Fees, charges, or payments in connection with the administration of
estates or trusts pursuant to Division 7 . . . Division 8 . . . or Division 9 . . . of
the Probate Code.
(f) Fees, charges, or payments imposed by lenders or purchasers of loans, as
these entities are described in subdivision (c) of Section 10232 of the Business
and Professions Code.
(g) Assessments, charges, penalties, or fees authorized by the Davis-Stirling
Common Interest Development Act (Title 6 (commencing with section 1350)
of Part (4).
(h) Fees, charges or payments for failing to comply with, or for transferring
the real property prior to satisfying, an obligation to construct residential
improvements on real property.
(i) Any fee reflected in a document recorded against the property on or
before December 31, 2007, that is separate from any covenants, conditions, and
restrictions, and that substantially complies with subdivision (a) of Section
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requirement.250 In California, transfer fee covenants are enforceable against
successors as long as the person imposing the covenant records a document
indicating “Payment of Transfer Fee Required” in the chain of title.251 This
is very similar to one of the federal proposals, which would require full
disclosure.252 Thus, at least several legislators believe that a disclosure
requirement would be helpful in protecting homebuyers from the
detrimental effects of private transfer fees.253 While limitations, like
requiring notice to homeowners, in these states might not solve all the
negative implications of private transfer fees, they lessen some of the
harmful impacts on homeowners and buyers.
C. Remaining States Should Adopt Either a Ban or Restriction on the Use of
Transfer Fee Covenants
While the majority of states have yet to restrict or ban transfer fee
covenants, this is unsurprising as transfer fee covenants have not been used
as they currently are by Freehold, for many years. However, as use of this
new legal strategy spreads, state legislatures should provide assistance to
homeowners. First, states should consider the fact that homeowners are
rarely provided adequate or sufficient notice of a transfer fee covenant.
This should be the first issue a state addresses regarding transfer fee
covenants. Second, states should consider banning transfer fee covenants,
as used by private buyers and developers, in whole or in part because of
their deleterious effects.
1. States Should Immediately Be Concerned With Providing Notice
As discussed above, a major concern with transfer fee covenants is
inadequate notice for homeowners. This is especially significant given that
the “common law of covenants evolved in large part in response to notice
concerns.”254 Because of this, states which have yet to enact notice
1098.5 by providing a prospective transferee notice of the following:
(1) Payment of a transfer fee required.
(2) The amount or method of calculation of the fee.
(3) The date or circumstances under which the transfer fee payment
requirement expires, if any.
(4) The entity to which the fee will paid. (5) The general purposes for which
the fee will be used.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098 (West 2008).
250. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098 (West 2008).
251. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24.
252. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2010).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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requirements may want to first consider this intermediary step before
deciding whether to ban or restrict transfer fees altogether.
Private transfer fees have many uses and the idea of a private transfer fee
covenant has been used for many years in property law.255 However, prior
uses of transfer fees, like those involved with a homeowners’ association,
are much different than the private transfer fee used and patented by
Freehold and other similar companies. For example, when a resident
moves into a new home or new area, the existence of a homeowners’
association and what flows from membership is seemingly known or at
least knowable.256 Even if new homeowners are unaware of a specific fee,
they presumably have an idea of what homeowners’ associations are, that
they exist, and that their land may be burdened by payment to a
homeowners’ association.257 Furthermore, because of this basic knowledge,
when homeowners become aware of the fee, they are often unsurprised or
find that the fee is so low that their lack of knowledge was not so
unbearable as to keep them from buying the property at all.258 For example,
in one instance a homeowner found out about the homeowners’ association
dues much later in the contract signing stage than he would have liked.259
However, upon finding out that the dues were only twenty-one dollars a
month, paid twice a year, he decided to go ahead with the purchase
anyway.260 This is evidence that homeowners, even without actual notice,
tend to have a more ready understanding of covenants used with
homeowners’ associations.
Additionally, a resident can almost always see, upon arriving in the
community or near the home, what requirements may be part of
homeowners’ association covenants.261 While homeowners may not have
notice of specific rules, which can sometimes be problematic, they do tend
to have a visual of what the homeowners’ association requirements and
dues might entail.262
However, the same cannot be said for private transfer covenant fees used
by a private developer to place a covenant on the land for the next ninetynine years. First, most homeowners, especially those without a legal
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See Fennell, supra note 193, at 829-30.
See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 743-51; see also Fennell, supra note 193.
See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 747-48.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 743-51; see also Fennell, supra note 193.
See Wiseman, supra note 192, 743-51.
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background, have probably never heard of a private transfer fee. Second,
even with prior knowledge of what a covenant or, more specifically, a
private transfer fee covenant is, many homeowners are unlikely to know the
details of how such a covenant functions and how it may burden their land
for a long period of time.
The obligation to pay the transfer fee may not always be readily apparent
and any state which has not already limited transfer fees should follow
states like California, which have made disclosure a mandatory condition of
any property transfer including a private transfer fee covenant.
2. State Legislatures Should Ban or Restrict Private Transfer Fees
While homeowners should act to protect themselves when purchasing a
home by reading all documents and employing the necessary professionals,
the government should also step in and ban or restrict the use of private
transfer fee covenants. Freehold claims that a multitude of property types
can benefit from the use of private transfer fees: “office buildings, mixeduse projects, hotels/motels, apartment complexes, retail centers, warehouse
facilities, industrial facilities, condominiums, residential subdivisions . . . .”263 Most potential buyers of these types of properties have the
sophistication and legal knowledge to make a full assessment of the
benefits of contracting with a company like Freehold. However, most
homebuyers lack similar sophistication to understand the implications of a
private transfer fee covenant.264 Often, a home is the biggest purchase a
person will make in a lifetime and such a purchaser is likely to be much less
sophisticated than the developer or company who is attempting to use the
covenant. Additionally, the purchaser will not feel the effects of the private
transfer fee until required to pay it years later upon the sale of the
property.265 All of these factors put homeowners and buyers in a weaker
position than that described by those positing that the use of transfer fee
covenants will have obvious benefits for everyone.266 Instead, it seems
much more likely that the only party benefiting from the use of a private
transfer fee covenant is the company and holder of the right to receive
payment.
States often step in to protect consumers in similar situations. For
example, “lemon laws” in states like Oklahoma protect consumers from

263.
264.
265.
266.

FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77.
Id.
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faulty new cars.267 These laws attempt to avert surprise when new cars do
not conform to the reasonable expectations of purchasers.268 Similarly,
consumers who are taken by surprise by a private transfer fee should be
protected. Also, a “lemon law” comes into effect to protect consumers
when the car defect substantially interferes with the use of the car.269
Likewise, since the private transfer fee imposes such a hefty cost upon the
homeowner, the homeowner should be protected from such a surprise at the
time it first arises. While states cannot and likely should not protect
homeowners from covenants already signed and in place, they should
protect future homeowners from falling into the same trap. While some
potential buyers may have the ability to protect themselves from the
undesired effects of a private transfer fee, homebuyers on the whole do not.
States and the federal government should protect homebuyers from
sophisticated attempts to make a profit off of consumers’ lack of
knowledge.
D. As the Use Of Private Transfer Fees Becomes More Wide-Spread, It Is
Likely that More States and the Federal Government Will Follow the
Suggestions of This Comment and Ban or Restrict Their Use
Notably, “as use of private transfer fee covenants has accelerated, both
the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and the American Land Title
Association (ALTA) have adopted comparable policy statements against
the use and enforcement of private transfer fee covenants.”270 The
American Land Title Association’s statement says “these covenants provide
no benefit to consumers or the public, but rather cost consumers money,
complicate the safe, efficient and legal transfer of real estate, and depress
home prices.”271 The statement released by The National Association of
Realtors says “such fees decrease affordability, serve no public purpose,
and provide no benefit to property purchasers, or the community in which
the property is located.”272 Both the National Association of Realtors and

267. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 901 (2009).
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24.
271. Private Transfer Fee Covenant, AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2010), http://
www.alta.org/advocacy/docs/PrivateTransferFeeCovenant_OnePager.pdf.
272. Legislative Update, MISSISSIPPI ASS’N OF REALTORS), http://www.comvest.net/docu
ments/MARLegislativeUpdateFeb2011.pdf.
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the American Land Title Association are “seeking to introduce in state
legislatures a model statute banning transfer fee covenants.”273
The model statute introduced by the National Association of Realtors
and the American Land Title Association would invalidate transfer fee
covenants added after the statute’s effective date, but not those before the
effective date.274 A court facing a challenge to covenants that precede the
statute should evaluate their enforceability against successors based on the
common law of covenants and servitudes and “ought to conclude that such
a covenant does not run with the land to bind successors.”275
The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s proposed ban would affect most
states because of the influence of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other
government owned lenders. The proposal would prohibit Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks from investing in
mortgages on properties with private transfer fee covenants.276 Its guidance
applies to mortgages and securities purchased by those banks or acquired as
collateral for advances and to mortgages and securities purchased by Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac.277 The proposed guidance for government sponsored
enterprises was published August 16, 2010.278 The Federal Housing
Finances Agency expresses concerns regarding transfer fee covenants,
saying that the covenants may increase cost of homeownership, hamper
affordability, reduce liquidity in both primary and secondary mortgage
markets, limit transfers or render them legally uncertain, and expose
lenders, title companies, and secondary market participants to risks from
unknown potential liens and title defects.279
Transfer fee covenants may reduce transparency because they often are
not disclosed by sellers and are difficult to discover through customary title
searches, especially by successive purchasers.280 As these problems
become more widely recognized, the number of states banning or restricting
the use of transfer fee covenants continues to grow. Just recently, North
Dakota Senators Grindberg, Lee, and Robinson and Representatives
Gruchalla, Klemin, and Louser introduced a state bill proposing a
273. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 24-25.
276. FHFA Proposes Ban on GSE Investments in Loans on Properties with Private
Transfer Fee Covenants, HDR CURRENT DEVS., Aug. 23, 2010, available at 38 NO. CD-17
HDRCURDEV 19 (Westlaw).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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prohibition on the use of private transfer fees.281 Furthermore, a founder of
National Association of Land Title Examiners and Abstractors and
SourceofTitle.com, Robert Franco, predicts that another ten states, at least,
will follow suit in 2011.282 Mr. Franco has catalogued the private transfer
fee covenant evolution on his blog for years.283 While he may not be
correct about the number of states, his prediction has ample basis for
support. Even federal legislators have introduced two bills restricting or
banning private transfer fees.284 Also, at the beginning of 2010, only six
states banned private transfer fees; however, by the end of that year, the
number had grown to sixteen.285
Therefore, while only a minority of states ban or restrict the use of
private transfer fees, the remaining states and the federal government
should follow their lead. First, the majority of the states are likely to at
least consider a proposal to ban private transfer fees in the near future.
Second, those states which do not ban transfer fee covenants will lack
protections for homebuyers and homebuyers will feel the repercussions of
legislative inaction for many years. Third, if a state wants to avoid a total
ban, states can follow California’s lead and adopt disclosure requirements
in order to help homeowners best understand the documents they may sign
when they purchase their home. For those states considering proposals to
ban or restrict private transfer fees, their primary concern should be
protecting homeowners. The states can focus on notice or more fully
protect homeowners through total bans or partial restrictions.
VI. Transfer Fee Covenants Are a Dangerous and Novel Property Concept
Which Threatens to Make Purchasing Property Not Only Less Affordable
but Also a Much More Complicated Process That Threatens Alienability of
Land and Violates Public Policy Concerns
Transfer fee covenants are a sizeable step away from historical property
or contract law. Transfer fee covenants are made when a developer adds a
covenant to a deed, generally, which requires payment of a fee. This fee
must be paid from the new buyer back to the developer. The fee is

281. S. 2149, 62th Leg. (N.D. 2011).
282. Robert Franco, My Predictions for 2011, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog_node.aspx?uniq=736.
283. See generally Robert Franco, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG, http://www.sourceoftitle.com.
284. Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2009-2010).
285. Letter from Mark Winter, President, ALTA, to Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel,
FHFA (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.alta.org/press/FHA_101510.pdf.
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generally 1% of the sale price, which is re-calculated every time the
property is sold to a new buyer for the next ninety-nine years.
Companies like Freehold are selling this device as an easy and
continuously lucrative alternative to requiring the first buyer to bear all of
the cost. However, this is dangerous as it may inhibit alienability of land.
Additionally, it seems to be a covenant which violates the law of covenants.
First, it does not touch and concern the land. Second, privity is never
established. Third, it seems to allow the developer or holder of the right to
obtain payment and to retain a right to the property without having any
actual right to possession.
Finally, as a matter of public policy, transfer fee covenants violate the
most basic understandings of property law, especially clear title. Transfer
fees threaten to cloud title and to make it all too difficult to transfer
property. Our society values the alienability of land and clear title, and
private transfer fees potentially make it much more difficult for a buyer,
and later a seller, to transfer land. Additionally, buyers may be mostly, or
even completely, unaware of the fact that a private transfer fee covenant is
attached to the land they are purchasing. As with other types of covenants,
homeowners typically do not realize or understand what is attached to the
land, and this is especially problematic when the covenant requires a large
sum to be paid to a private party before the land can be re-sold and attaches
to that land for a long period of time: ninety-nine years.
Amy Kathleen Lewis
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